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Why does so much Atlantic history appear to end in 1825? Con-sidering both historical processes and historiography, that date 
seems to have some obvious advantages, marking the end of the great 
Age of Revolution with the independence of much of Spanish Amer-
ica. It is also a nice quarter-of-a-century break, better, one supposes, 
than 1826 when the Spanish garrison holding Callao, Peru fi nally sur-
rendered. More importantly, choosing 1825 allows Atlantic history to 
end with a note of triumph, one that can be embraced by historians of 
all political stripes, be they conservative, liberal, or radical, as almost 
all claim some aspect of the Age of Revolution as their own. However, 
does the Age of Revolution accurately mark the end of the political 
processes of Atlantic history? The recent fl ourishing of scholarship on 
Latin American nation and state formation, even if most of it is not 
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Archivo Central del Cauca, the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, and the Biblioteca Nacional 
in Colombia, the Museo Histórico Municipal in Uruguay, and the Library of Congress in 
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University New Faculty Research Grant and the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of 
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directly engaged with Atlantic history, strongly suggests that the Age of 
Revolution’s debates over citizenship, sovereignty, and rights continued 
unabated, even intensifi ed, in the nineteenth century.1 What would be 
the ramifi cations of taking this scholarship seriously for understanding 
the history of the Atlantic world system? I argue that, at least for Span-
ish America, the struggles over visions of republicanism and democracy 
1 I hesitate to try to cite all of this literature, as it has grown so vast; a partial listing 
of key works include Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post-Colonial 
Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Gilbert M. Joseph and 
Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of 
Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994); Antonio Annino 
and François-Xavier Guerra, eds., Inventando la nación: Iberoamérica, siglo XIX (México, 
D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003); Hilda Sábato, ed., Ciudadanía política y formación 
de las naciones: Perspectives históricas de América Latina (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1999); Mark Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Post-
Colonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); Peter 
F. Guardino, The Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750 –1850 (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); Elías José Palti, La invención de una legitimidad: Razón y 
retórica en el pensamiento mexicano del siglo XIX (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
2005); Sarah C. Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, 
Peru, 1780 –1854 (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 1999); Ada Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999); Ulrich Muecke, Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Peru: The Rise 
of the Partido Civil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Francie R. Chassen-
López, From Liberal to Revolutionary Oaxaca: The View from the South, Mexico, 1867–1911 
(University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2004); Greg Grandin, The Blood of 
Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000); 
Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780 –1840 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999); Marixa Lasso, “Race War and Nation in 
Caribbean Gran Colombia, Cartagena, 1810–1832,” American Historical Review 111 (April 
2006): 336 –361; Jorge Myers, Orden y virtud: El discurso republicano en el régimen rosista 
(Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1995); Guy P. C. Thomson with David 
G. LaFrance, Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan 
Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1999); James 
E. Sanders, Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century 
Colombia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004); Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation 
Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810 –1910 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Richard A. Warren, Vagrants and Citizens: Politics and the Masses 
in Mexico City from Colony to Republic (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2001); Jer-
emy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Cecilia Méndez, The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and 
the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820 –1850 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); 
Peter M. Beattie, The Tribute of Blood: Army, Honor, Race, and Nation in Brazil, 1864–1945 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001); Gunnar Mendoza L., Rossana Barragán R., 
Dora Cajías, and Seemin Qayum, eds., El siglo XIX: Bolivia y América Latina (La Paz: Muela 
del Diablo Editores, 1997); Victor M. Uribe-Uran, ed., State and Society in Spanish America 
during the Age of Revolution (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2001); Ricardo D. Salvatore; 
Wandering Paysanos: State Order and Subaltern Experience in Argentina during the Rosas Era 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); and Antonio Annino, ed., Historia de las elec-
ciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX: De la formación del espacio político nacional (Buenos Aires: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995). 
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that wracked the region throughout most of the nineteenth century 
cannot be understood outside of an Atlantic context, nor can the full 
history of the Atlantic Age of Revolution be complete without taking 
into account the democratic and republican developments of mid nine-
teenth-century Spanish America. Ending studies of the Atlantic world 
in the early nineteenth century has worked to obscure the importance 
of these later political struggles and their Atlantic character, thereby 
emphasizing events and processes in the North Atlantic, while ignor-
ing sites of democratic innovation such as Colombia, which, as I will 
argue below, enjoyed universal adult male suffrage, racially inclusive 
citizenship, and active subaltern participation in the political system 
by the 1850s. Likewise, keeping these political struggles in their inter-
national context helps to avoid classifying Spanish American repub-
lics as fundamentally alien to North American and European politics, 
instead illuminating the Atlantic nature of the republican political 
culture of Spanish America until the 1880s—when democratic repub-
licanism declined as the region fully entered into a new neo-colonial 
global economic and political system.2 
Of course, not everyone would choose 1825 and the events of the 
Age of Revolution as the end of Atlantic history, but the late eigh-
teenth or early nineteenth century does seem to be a popular, although 
not universal, termination of the Atlantic project. Most studies’ peri-
odization follows the establishment and eventual termination of formal 
colonies, which, given the intricate links between the Atlantic World 
and colonialism, seems quite logical.3 Yet the nation and state forma-
2 For Latin American politics as being fundamentally different from the North Atlantic 
politics, see Richard M. Morse, New World Soundings: Culture and Ideology in the Americas 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Howard J. Wiarda, ed., Politics and Social 
Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1992).
3 For examples of Atlantic histories ending in the early nineteenth or late eighteenth 
century, see Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed 
Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Bos-
ton: Beacon Press, 2000); Peggy Liss, Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 
1713–1826 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); R. R. Palmer, The Age of 
the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760 –1800, 2 vols. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964); Thomas Benjamin, Timothy 
Hall, and David Rutherford, eds., The Atlantic World in the Age of Empire (Boston: Hough-
ton Miffl in Company, 2001); Wim Klooster and Alfred Padula, eds., The Atlantic World: 
Essays on Slavery, Migration and Imagination (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2005); 
Horst Pietschmann, Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System, 1580 –1830 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2002); John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of 
the Atlantic World, 1400–1800, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
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tion literature cited above and the theoretical work of postcolonial 
studies should push scholars not to assume that the legacies of colo-
nialism, or, more importantly for this article, the effects of the struggles 
against colonialism, end with nominal independence. Donna Gabaccia 
has persuasively argued that those interested in Atlantic history should 
not be bound by the standard timeline, noting that all kinds of politi-
cal, economic, intellectual, and cultural factors extend beyond the 
standard periodization; as this article argues, this periodization is par-
ticularly deleterious for understanding Spanish American and Atlantic 
politics.4 Studies of abolition, or the black Atlantic, seems to be the 
main exception to this trend, and thus 1888 might be the second most 
popular end point for defi ning the Atlantic system.5 For our purposes, 
however, and as historians of postemancipation societies have shown, 
the struggles of the black Atlantic continued much beyond legal aboli-
tion in demands for full social, economic, and political citizenship.6 
Phillip Beidler and Gary Taylor, eds., Writing Race Across the Atlantic World: Medieval to 
Modern (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2005); David Armitage, Greater Britain, 1516 –1776: 
Essays in Atlantic History (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004); M. J. Seymour, The Transforma-
tion of the North Atlantic World, 1492–1763 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004); Elizabeth 
Mancke and Carole Shammas, eds., The Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Juan Javier Pescador, The New World Inside a 
Basque Village: The Oiartzun Valley and its Atlantic Emigrants, 1550 –1800 (Reno: Univer-
sity of Nevada Press, 2004); Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagina-
tion: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830 (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Douglas J. Hamilton, Scotland, the Caribbean 
and the Atlantic World, 1750 –1820 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); and 
Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Historiographies, Epis-
temologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2001).
4 Donna Gabaccia, “A Long Atlantic in a Wider World,” Atlantic Studies: Literary, Cul-
tural and Historical Perspectives 1 (April 2004): 1–27. Brading’s intellectual history of creole 
patriotism happily does extend into the nineteenth century, even if he does not think much 
of the actual, as opposed to intellectual, democratic republics or of subalterns’ role in creat-
ing them. D. A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the 
Liberal State 1492–1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Likewise, Dunker-
ley’s wonderfully idiosyncratic Americana is not so much concerned with republicanism, as 
with Atlantic international connections and mentalities. James Dunkerley, Americana: The 
Americas in the World, around 1850 (London: Verso, 2000).
5 Of course, slavery in the Atlantic World did not end in 1888, as it continued in 
Africa. For 1888 as ending point, see Gabaccia, “A Long Atlantic,” p. 5; Alan L. Karras, 
“The Atlantic World as a Unit of Study,” in Atlantic American Societies, from Columbus 
through Abolition, 1492–1888, ed. Alan L. Karras and J. R. McNeill (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 7; J. R. McNeill, “The End of the Old Atlantic World: America, Africa, Europe, 
1770 –1888,” in Karras and McNeill, Atlantic American Societies, pp. 245–268.
6 George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800 –2000 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); and Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005).
Sanders: Atlantic Republicanism in 19th-Century Colombia 135
Equally important, abolition in Spanish America cannot be separated 
from the democratic republican movements through which emancipa-
tion was so often achieved.7 Beyond studies of slavery and abolition, 
however, most Atlantic works do not venture far into the nineteenth 
century, as is the case with the most important university institution 
for studying the Atlantic and the two most infl uential master narra-
tives of Atlantic history.
Harvard University’s “International Seminar on the History of the 
Atlantic World, 1500 –1825” lays out the dates precisely and has been 
one of the most infl uential shapers of Atlantic history, along with its 
director, Bernard Bailyn. Bailyn’s book Atlantic History: Concept and 
Contours, while charting the course of Atlantic history, also ends in 
the early nineteenth century, although he curiously never justifi es or 
even explains why he has chosen to do so, other than to cursorily note 
that the Atlantic system was replaced with a “global world system.” 8 
Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, while positing a very different 
vision of Atlantic history, also end their The Many-Headed Hydra dur-
ing the Age of Revolution. They offer “the early 1790s” as when the 
“egalitarian, multiethnic conception of humanity” promoted by work-
ing people across the Atlantic was replaced by more particular move-
ments of the “Working Class” and “Black Power,” dividing a previously 
united movement of the commons by race, class, and nationality.9 Yet 
whether one is tracing Bailyn’s liberal republican movements or Rediker 
and Linebaugh’s radical struggles for human liberation, the late eigh-
teenth or early nineteenth century cannot serve as the end to either 
of these stories in Spanish America. Spanish America’s liberal republi-
can movements would not triumph until midcentury, well after Bailyn 
ends his narrative. In addition, these social and political movements 
triumphed in many places only because of their linkage with radical 
struggles for human liberation that, unlike in Rediker and Linebaugh’s 
North Atlantic, had not yet divided along racial lines and because a 
class of industrial workers separate from other subaltern laborers had 
not yet emerged.10 
7 Abolition did not tend to happen “quickly” after the wars of independence in Latin 
America, as McNeill suggests, but often involved a sustained campaign to claim rights under 
citizenship. McNeill, “End of the Old Atlantic World,” p. 259.
8 Bailyn, Atlantic History, p. 111.
9 Linebaugh and Rediker, Many-Headed Hydra, pp. 333–334.
10 I think Rediker and Linebaugh are essentially correct concerning the North Atlan-
tic; further comparative studies are needed to theorize why the North Atlantic and South 
Atlantic (or English and Spanish) systems had such variation.
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The democratic and republican discourse and practices of politics 
begun in the Atlantic Age of Revolution would peak in many parts of 
Spanish America in the 1850s and 1860s. In these years, subaltern polit-
ical movements forced ruling elites to democratically expand notions 
of citizenship and rights far beyond that achieved in other areas of the 
Atlantic World. As we will see in the case of Colombia below, popular 
liberals allied with elite liberals to open citizenship to all adult males 
regardless of race, literacy, or property holding, and this new citizen 
class would radically change the culture of Colombian republican poli-
tics, signifi cantly democratizing it. Popular liberals would exploit this 
democratic republicanism in their quest for human liberation, most 
successfully concerning the abolition of slavery and less so concern-
ing redefi ning property to include the “commons.” While many elites 
reacted in horror at these events, others accepted them as markers of 
Colombia’s modernity in the Atlantic World and success in securing 
human freedom, especially compared to the poor record of European 
societies. However, concerns over order and capitalist development 
would eventually triumph—if, of course, incompletely—as elites acted 
to suppress this Atlantic democratic republicanism in the 1880s. Thus 
while recognizing the danger of historical periodization and the efface-
ment it often does to the reality of historical diversity and agency,11 in 
this case especially to the story of Cuba whose independence occurred 
much later, I propose that to understand Spanish American political life 
that Atlantic history must be extended through most of the nineteenth 
century. I should also state that while democratic republican move-
ments collapsed in the 1880s, I am not suggesting this decade as a new 
endpoint of Atlantic historical processes, only that opening up Atlan-
tic history beyond the 1820s is necessary to complete the story of the 
Age of Revolution while allowing historians to rethink both the role 
of republicanism in Spanish American history and the role of Spanish 
America in the world history of democracy and republicanism. 
Atlantic Republicanism in Colombia
Colombia gained its independence with struggles over rights, democ-
racy, and republicanism that nicely fi t the model of the Atlantic World’s 
11 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), pp. 19–22.
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denouement.12 As Bailyn notes, however, the region’s late joining of 
the Age of Revolution would end in the “collapse of Latin America’s 
new republics into despotic fi efdoms and anarchic city-states.” 13 Until 
recently, most scholars of Spanish American history would have agreed 
with this assessment, considering nineteenth-century republicanism 
as largely a failure. Subalterns were interested in neither the nation 
nor democratic republicanism, but were only concerned with the patria 
chica of their immediate surroundings, entering politics only as the cli-
ents of powerful patrons. Elites were not divided by different visions of 
politics, but instead only squabbled over the spoils of the state, despair-
ing of their societies’ backwardness.14 Latin America would eventually 
reenter a global capitalist system after the chaos of the Wars of Inde-
pendence, but the political seeds sowed by the Atlantic Age of Revolu-
tion had apparently failed to germinate.
A new scholarship emerging in the 1990s challenged these interpre-
tations. As scholars began delving into Spanish American nineteenth-
century popular politics, they found the lower classes intensely engaged 
with the republican politics of the Atlantic Age of Revolution: wres-
tling with the new concept of the nation, appropriating citizenship to 
their own ends and reframing liberty, equality, and fraternity.15 These 
debates began during and immediately after independence, but often 
accelerated in the 1850s and 1860s, as reforming liberal parties took 
power. While most of this work has not been concerned with Atlantic 
history directly, the new historiography does challenge the standing 
contours of Atlantic history, since the republican politics that emerged 
in nineteenth-century Spanish America were a direct consequence of 
Atlantic processes springing from the Age of Revolution. And Span-
ish America was the principal site where republicanism developed. 
Although Spanish America is generally ignored when considering the 
history of democracy and republicanism, in 1847 there were only two 
national republics in the Atlantic World outside of Spanish Amer-
12 See Alfonso Múnera, El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colom-
biano (1717–1810) (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1998); Lasso, “Race War and Nation”; 
and Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770 –1835 (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2004).
13 Bailyn, Atlantic History, p. 110.
14 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), pp. 74, 78, 93–100; and Frank Safford, “Social Aspects 
of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America: New Granada, 1825–1850,” Journal of 
Social History 5 (Spring 1972): 344–370.
15 See note 1 above.
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ica. (Tellingly, in Hobsbawm’s world map of republicanism, most of 
South America is obscured by an inset of Europe, although Switzer-
land was Europe’s sole republic at this time.16) Therefore, the evolution 
of democracy and republicanism in Spanish America is an important 
aspect of Atlantic history that cannot be ignored.
Of course, these republican movements acted nationally and 
indeed were central to the process of nation formation, so while the 
internationalism of republican progress was a concern, as we will see 
below, Atlantic republicanism developed on distinct national stages 
within Latin America. Republicanism was important in all of Spanish 
America and even in Brazil, where it served as a vehicle to challenge 
both the ruling monarchy and slavery, but it seems to have had some-
what less potency and a less popular cast in the Andean highlands.17 
Brooke Larson has argued that liberal republicanism’s hostility to indig-
enous identity and Andean elites’ fear of indigenous majorities limited 
the development and effi cacy of republicanism in the new Andean 
nations. Larson notes, however, that this was not due to lack of inter-
est by the Indians themselves, who in hostile environments still tried 
to embrace republican political movements, even if panicked elites 
eventually countered these indigenous efforts with severe repression.18 
While research is ongoing in many areas, it seems Mexico and Colom-
bia adopted republicanism most vociferously, at both the elite and the 
popular levels.19 
By the 1850s, after liberals took power and opened up the political 
system, Colombians of all political classes were remaking politics in the 
Atlantic tradition, debating the meanings of nation, citizenship, lib-
erty, equality, and rights. Benedict Anderson assumes national identity 
was largely an elite affair in Spanish America, but even if this were the 
case during independence, it was certainly no longer true by the mid 
nineteenth century.20 Subalterns embraced the nation as a site of new 
political identities that might be more powerful than their old posi-
tions in society forged under colonialism. For example, the residents of 
16 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848–1875 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 
p. 312.
17 João José Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Spencer L. Leitman, “The Black Raga-
muffi ns: Racial Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-Century Southern Brazil,” Americas 33 (January 
1977): 504–518.
18 Larson, Trials of Nation Making; see also, Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided; 
Méndez, Plebeian Republic.
19 Thomson with LaFrance, Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism, p. xiii.
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
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a frontier hamlet, after noting how they and their families had sacri-
fi ced to create a new settlement out of a “miserable wilderness” and had 
even built a church, asserted that before their arrival the land did not 
give “any benefi t to the nation,” but they would “give to the nation the 
benefi t of a civilized and religious village.” 21 The most important iden-
tity within the nation was that of citizenship, claimed by almost all the 
lower class, be they ex-slaves, Indians, or mestizo peasants. Scholars who 
practiced Atlantic history before that term came into vogue assumed 
there was no “national consciousness” in Latin America beyond a small 
elite and that the poor had no interest in national politics, leaving such 
history making to the European working class.22 Yet the declaration 
of Indians from a village in the southwestern Cauca that states,“We 
are free citizens, like any other civilized Caucano,” reveals the limita-
tions of such assumptions.23 Ex-slaves declared to the national con-
gress in 1852 that “We enjoy the precious possession of liberty, so long 
usurped, and with it all the other rights and prerogatives of citizens.” 24 
Although free on 1 January of that year, most if not all of the peti-
tioners would not have been legal citizens as they would have lacked 
the necessary property. Yet the vociferousness of subalterns’ claims to 
citizenship, even when legally excluded, forced Colombian elites des-
perate for lower-class allies to grant universal adult male citizenship in 
the 1853 constitution. While legal citizenship and suffrage rights are 
perhaps not the best measure of political involvement, they do allow 
easy comparison with other parts of the Atlantic world.25 Instead of 
seeming backward and an imitator of Europe and the United States, 
in comparison Colombia was much advanced in extending citizenship 
beyond the racial and class barriers of the North Atlantic.
Colombia’s subalterns would use their newly claimed citizenship to 
reimagine the meanings of liberty, equality, fraternity and then employ 
21 This and all subsequent translations mine. Residents of Cabal Parish [over seventy-
fi ve names, majority signed for by others] to Honorable Representatives and Senators of the 
Congress [national], Cabal, 1 May 1849, Archivo del Congreso (Bogotá) (hereafter AC), 
1849, Senado, Leyes Autografas II, p. 175.
22 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848 (Cleveland: World Publishing 
Company, 1962), p. 143, see also p. 121.
23 Members of the Cabildo Pequeño de Indígenas and Adults of the Village of Sibundoy 
[over sixty names, majority signed with an X] to Citizen President of the State, Sibundoy, 8 
November 1874, Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán) (hereafter ACC), Archivo Muerto, 
Paquete 129, Legajo 45, no page number.
24 Residents of San Juan [twenty-four names, all signed with an X] to Citizen Sena-
tors and Representatives [national], no place or date on letter [1852], AC, 1852, Senado, 
Proyectos Negados II, p. 19.
25 Annino, Historia de las elecciones; Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ed., Elections Before Democ-
racy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America (London: Institute of Latin Ameri-
can Studies, 1996).
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this new political discourse to challenge existing economic and social 
relations. Afro-Colombians entered into a long-running alliance with 
the Liberal Party, fi ghting as soldiers in civil wars and voting in elec-
tions; in return they won citizenship, suffrage rights, the repeal of 
vagrancy laws, freedom from onerous monopolies on liquor and tobacco 
production and consumption, a reform of judicial codes including the 
termination of the death penalty, a return of some common lands, and 
most importantly the abolition of slavery.26 Indeed it is in slavery’s abo-
lition (the one area of Atlantic history that usually does extend further 
into the nineteenth century) that we see how the red (or radical) and 
black Atlantics unite into one, for the abolition of slavery in Spanish 
America occurred as part of an Atlantic movement to secure rights as 
citizens of a republic, as Reid Andrews has shown.27 While Rediker and 
Linebaugh see the Haitian Revolution as bifurcating the united move-
ment of working people along racial lines, this is not how that revolu-
tion was understood by subalterns in Spanish America.28 Marixa Lasso 
argues that blacks and mulattos along the Caribbean coast of Colombia 
understood the Haitian Revolution as a republican struggle for equal 
rights and the abolition of slavery, not a race war.29 In the process of 
securing these very real social and economic gains, Afro-Colombians 
played a part in redefi ning the most important and powerful tropes of 
the Atlantic world: democracy, republicanism, liberty, equality, and 
fraternity. Ex-slaves did not claim “liberty” lightly, investing the word 
with more than a list of rights guaranteed to white property holders and 
expanding the concept to include a general freedom from oppression 
for people of all races and classes. Afro-Colombians also appropriated 
notions of equality, demanding land for all those who worked it, as 
toiling for others forced tenants “to be the peons and tributaries of an 
individual and to cease to be citizens of a free people.” 30 Colombia’s 
popular liberals thus both acted in an Atlantic tradition, by claiming 
26 James E. Sanders, “‘Citizens of a Free People’: Popular Liberalism and Race in Nine-
teenth-Century Southwestern Colombia,” Hispanic American Historical Review 84 (May 
2004): 277–313.
27 Andrews, Afro-Latin America, pp. 85–115.
28 Linebaugh and Rediker, Many-Headed Hydra, pp. 340–341.
29 Marixa Lasso, “Haiti as an Image of Popular Republicanism in Caribbean Colom-
bia: Cartagena Province (1811–1828),” in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlan-
tic World, ed. David P. Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 
176–190.
30 The Undersigned Members of the Democratic Society of Cali [over 180 names, many 
with very rough handwriting or signed for by others] to Citizen President of the State, Cali, 
1 June 1877, ACC, Archivo Muerto, Paquete 137, Legajo 7, no page number.
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a citizenship invested with rights, and remade that tradition, by trans-
forming republicanism into a vehicle capable of promoting visions of 
social equality that had been defi ned so differently under the racial and 
class parameters of Europe and the United States.
Thus Afro-Colombians continued and broadened the work begun 
by slaves and freedpeople in the French Caribbean during the Atlantic 
Age of Revolution. As Laurent Dubois argues, “The democratic pos-
sibilities imperial powers would claim they were bringing to the colo-
nies had in fact been forged, not within the boundaries of Europe, but 
through the struggles over rights that spread throughout the Atlantic 
Empires.” 31 Yet, these struggles would not end in 1825, but continue, 
with even more success than during the Age of Revolution, throughout 
the nineteenth century. This perspective also rescues republicanism 
and democracy from “Western” history or “Western Civilization” and 
resituates it in an Atlantic frame—dominated not by Europe or the 
United States, but by Spanish America and the African diaspora. New 
research on constitutional and liberal thought in nineteenth-century 
India may push studies of republicanism and democracy’s development 
toward a truly global level, forcing a further rethinking of both the 
“West” and Atlantic history as valid concepts, although as of now stud-
ies of these movements suggest they had a less popular cast than those 
in Latin America.32 
A focus on the evolution of democracy and republicanism in the 
Atlantic World would also position Latin America as an equally impor-
tant node in a causal web that connected the Atlantic, instead of its 
standard relegation to the periphery. Latin America is usually consid-
ered important for studies of slavery and economics, but only with its 
tardy wars for independence does the region matter much politically 
31 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1787–1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 4–5. 
See also, Cooper, Colonialism, p. 21; Mark Thurner, “After Spanish Rule: Writing Another 
After,” in After Spanish Rule: Post-Colonial Predicaments of the Americas, ed. Mark Thurner 
and Andrés Guerrero (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 30.
32 For studies of elite thought, see C. A. Bayly, “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of 
Constitutional Liberalism in India, 1800–30,” Modern Intellectual History 4 (April 2007): 
25–41; Amartya Kumar Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture, 
and Identity (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). I am not suggesting that the South 
Asian working classes were not intensely engaged in political thought in the nineteenth 
century, only that many of their movements were not as invested in republicanism as similar 
popular movements were in the Atlantic world. See Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of 
Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983). Of course, by the 
twentieth century, this would not be the case. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought in the 
Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
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for the Atlantic story. Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra’s How to Write the His-
tory of the New World is the exception to this trend. Cañizares-Esguerra 
positions his “Spanish American baroque” intellectual / political move-
ment as one that challenged the northern European Enlightenment 
rationality that formed the base of the political narrative of the Atlan-
tic world.33 However, neither Colombian subalterns nor elites thought 
of themselves as separate from the democratic republicanism of the 
enlightened Atlantic, but sought to position themselves as at its cen-
ter. While Cañizares-Esguerra wishes to place Spanish America apart,34 
peasants from a small frontier village in the Colombian Andes claimed 
their place in Atlantic history, asserting “liberty and independence are 
found in the cabin of the peasant too.” 35 
While most subalterns (although certainly not all, as we will see 
below) engaged the Atlantic world through their reformulation and 
appropriation of concepts of citizenship or liberty and equality, they, 
not surprisingly, did not make the same direct comparisons, as did many 
elites, with the rest of the Atlantic world. In nineteenth- century pro-
vincial Colombia, most elites assumed they were part of the  Atlantic 
political and cultural tradition. The upper class envisioned their civil 
wars as no different from those that convulsed Europe and especially 
understood the United States’ fratricidal confl ict as mirroring their own 
1851 civil war, when conservatives also revolted to preserve slavery.36 
(Mexican patriots also compared the U.S. Civil War with their own 
resistance to the French invasion and Maximillian’s monarchy; both 
societies were engaged in similar struggles of republicans and rights ver-
sus aristocrats and slavery.37) Colombians likened the sack of Cali, when 
popular liberals violently retook the town after a conservative revolt, to 
“the horrors of the French Revolution” or the Paris Commune.38 When 
Cali’s more popular Democratic Society marched through the streets 
33 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, p. 306.
34 Ibid., pp. 266–345.
35 The Assembly of Padres de Familia of the Aldea de Chinchiná to Citizen Legislators 
of the Republic, no place or date on letter but received in Bogotá on 2 February 1856, AC, 
1856, Cámara, Solicitudes IV, p. 20.
36 For Europe, see, César Conto to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 2 December 1874, 
Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, Bogotá, Sala de Manuscritos, MSS 113, p. 5. For the United 
States, see José Hilario López, Mensaje del Poder Ejecutivo a las Cámaras Legislativas (Bogotá: 
Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, 1852), p. 1.
37 La Guerra: Periódico Popular é Independiente (Morelia), 31 January 1862, 7 February 
1852.
38 Anonymous, “Relación de los sucesos de Cali,” 30 December 1876, ACC, Fondo 
Arboleda, Signatura 440, p. 1; see also, El Ferrocarril (Cali), 14 February 1878.
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to intimidate conservatives, they too “sang their Marseillaise.” 39 While 
Bailyn does note how the “public worlds” of Europe and Latin America 
were “especially close” at this time, he curiously keeps referring to the 
“West” in his narrative, although that concept was in little use dur-
ing the time period, and not really used at all in Latin America.40 Of 
course, the concepts of the “West” has since been used to exclude Latin 
America as an other of Europe and the United States, but this would 
have made little sense in midcentury Bogotá or Cali. 
Colombians did not see themselves as laggards in the Atlantic 
World, but felt their new, democratic nations were at the vanguard, 
compared to Europe’s tired, feudal states. Colombian elites did not just 
imagine themselves as mere followers of Atlantic political currents, 
but rather saw themselves as “the vanguard in America” along with 
other New World republics, including the United States.41 A Colom-
bian newspaperman exulted, “Europe is the past. America the Future. 
. . . When we talk of the Old World, we do not speak of you, young 
Italy! You are the America of Europe.” 42 Another newspaper referred 
to Italy as “our sister” who “will be the sentinel for American Rights, 
stationed at the gates of the European monarchies.” 43 The New World, 
and perhaps young Italy, was the site of progress and the future in the 
Atlantic world; the Old World, including even prosperous England, 
was old, tired, decadent, monarchical, beset by violence, and weighed 
down by the feudal past.44 Walter Mignolo positions Latin America as 
somehow trapped by the Atlantic tradition, arguing that “postinde-
pendence nations articulated themselves within the liberal ideology 
of the modern world system. ‘Decolonization’ as fi nal horizon was still 
not available in the nineteenth century.” 45 Yet Colombians did not 
39 El Sentimiento Democrático (Cali), 10 January 1850.
40 Bailyn, Atlantic History, p. 109 (quotation), preface, pp. 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 24, 27, 55, 
104, 107.
41 La Unión (Popayán), 23 October 1864; see also, Julián Trujillo, Eliseo Payán, and 
Manuel del Quijano to Deputies of the Constitutional Convention, Popayán, 15 July 1872, 
ACC, Archivo Muerto, Paquete 116, Legajo 16, no page number.
42 El Caucano (Cali), 3 November 1864.
43 La Unión (Popayán), 30 October 1864; see also, La Unión (Popayán), 12 March 
1864. Yet another paper called Colombia the “American Italy.” El Cauca: Periódico Literario 
Dedicado a la Juventud (Popayán), 9 May 1874.
44 T. C. de Mosquera, “Mensaje del Gobernador de Estado a la Lejislatura de 1859,” 
Popayán, 11 August 1859, ACC, Archivo Muerto, Paquete 74, Legajo 48, no page number; 
La Unión (Popayán), 18 October 1863 and 31 January 1864; Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El pensa-
miento colombiano en el siglo XIX (Bogotá: Editorial Temis, 1964), pp. 3–74.
45 Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, 
and Border Thinking (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 133.
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“articulate” themselves within a system, but saw themselves as leading 
the way to the creation of a new democratic republicanism, at least 
before the 1870s. Also, decolonization was a concern of Colombian 
intellectuals, although lingering colonial effects were considered no 
worse than monarchy and feudalism in the imperial center. One writer 
evoked the Americas versus Europe thus: “The situation of America is 
dire; the fi ght is between the colonial system and the modern liberal 
spirit, between the paganism of the Roman priests and the evangeli-
cal Christian idea, between those that dream of re-establishing slavery, 
privilege, monarchy, theocracy and those that believe that all of those 
abominations should remain in Europe.” 46 
The idea that the rights of man would fi nd their most complete 
expression in Spanish America, as opposed to Europe, was not lim-
ited to Colombia. During the French intervention in Mexico (1862–
1867), one newspaper declared the invasion’s replacement of Mexico’s 
republic with a monarchy was designed to ensure “that the struggles 
in the New World for liberty to conquer the sacred rights of humanity 
become sterile in their results, because thrones shudder when democ-
racy  rapidly moves to achieve the destiny of the people: universal fra-
ternity.” 47 This writer not only positions Spanish America as part of a 
universal  fraternity of peoples, but places Mexico at the forefront of a 
struggle for rights in the Atlantic World. 
During the international and civil war of Uruguay (1836 –1852), 
in which Giuseppe Garibaldi fought for the republican government in 
Montevideo, a newspaper chastised the French, seen as abandoning 
the city to the forces of the Argentine caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas: 
“. . . neither the French nor other foreigners are the ones that have 
given us liberty or institutions. Thanks to our own efforts, we enjoy 
both more and better than the French, who are more slaves of Luis 
Felipe . . .” 48 Garibaldi united in one man the international republican 
46 El Caucano (Cali), 21 January 1864. The writer referred specifi cally to the U.S. Civil 
War and the French intervention in Mexico, as well as Colombia’s own resurgent Conserva-
tive Party. See also, El Ciudadano (Popayán), 17 June 1848.
Colombian politicians discursively supported Cuban patriots in their struggle against 
Spain and Mexican republicans against their imposed monarchy. Jorge Isaacs, Secretary of 
the Cámara de Representantes to Secretary of the Interior and Foreign Relations, Bogotá, 15 
June 1870, Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá) (hereafter AGN), Sección República, 
Fondo Congreso, Legajo 5, p. 553; Gaceta Ofi cial del Cauca (Popayán), 23 July 1867; Gaceta 
Ofi cial (Popayán), 31 July 1869.
47 La Guerra: Periódico Popular é Independiente (Morelia), 27 December 1861.
48 El Compás (Montevideo), 5 December 1840.
Sanders: Atlantic Republicanism in 19th-Century Colombia 145
struggle, as he fought against monarchies and dictatorships in Brazil 
and Uruguay before returning to Italy: “the hero of both Worlds.” 49 
The subaltern Italian Garibaldinos fi ghting in Uruguay’s civil war who 
remained in their Spanish American home wanted to send their bat-
tle fl ags to Genoa to serve as examples (to Europeans) that “free men 
and true republicans” could triumph in Europe as they had in the New 
World, showing even poor soldiers shared an Atlantic imagination.50 
Garibaldi, who would become a potent symbol of liberal republican-
ism throughout Spanish America, and his subaltern followers oper-
ated in an Atlantic that assumed a historical political unity. There was 
not the assumption that he, as a European, or Europe had a monopoly 
on political progress; on the contrary, Europe lagged the rest of the 
Atlantic World in securing democratic republicanism. As Colombian 
(New Granadan) president Manuel Mallarino asserted, “The Grana-
dan people, if not as prosperous and powerful as others whose existence 
measures centuries, is without a doubt as free as any in the New or Old 
Worlds.” 51 
So why by the 1880s in most parts of Spanish America was demo-
cratic republicanism waning and intellectuals looking to Europe or the 
United States as the fonts of modernity? The debilitation of the demo-
cratic republican project seemed to solidify in most of Spanish Amer-
ica in the 1880s, while recognizing that local contingencies, especially 
Cuba, which was still a colony in the 1880s, resist defi ning historical 
epochs. Beginning in the 1870s and accelerating thereafter, the most 
vibrant republican political cultures in Spanish America would lose 
their discursive power and their subaltern adherents would lose many 
of their rights in the evolving nation-states, such as under Mexico’s 
Porfi riato.52 A Spaniard writing in Mexico applauded Porfi rio Díaz’s 
efforts, noting that a “healthy dictatorship” was preferential to rowdy 
republics: “Political science knows nothing more lamentable than those 
49 La Nación (Montevideo), 4 June 1882.
50 Draft of letter from Italian Legion to Uruguayan National Government, Museo 
Histórico Municipal, Archivo y Biblioteca Pablo Blanco Acevedo (Montevideo), Colec-
ción Museo Histórico Nacional, Tomo 1283, no page number.
51 M. M. Mallarino, “Mensaje del Poder Ejecutivo al Congreso de la Nueva Granada 
en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1857,” Bogotá, 1 February 1857, AC, 1857, Cámara, Mensajes 
y Correspondencia IV, p. 30.
52 Mallon notes how “in many Latin American countries, suffrage was more limited in 
the late nineteenth century than at the beginning.” Florencia E. Mallon, “Subalterns and 
the Nation,” Dispositio/n 25, no. 52 (2005): 162. See also Hilda Sábato, The Many and the 
Few: Political Participation in Republican Buenos Aires (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), pp. 180–181.
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Republics where everyone rules and no one obeys. . . .” 53 Similarly, in 
Colombia, under the elite project for expanded state power called the 
Regeneration, subalterns lost the right to organize in political clubs and 
full citizenship in 1886, which had legally marked their inclusion in 
the republican nation.54 When Colombia’s elites had needed subaltern 
allies earlier in the century, they had tolerated the lower class’s appro-
priation of republicanism and democracy; however, the rising potency 
of the state in the 1880s created a new calculus of political power.
During and after the 1880s, elites and state bureaucrats were fi nally 
able to tame and control the power of nation, citizenship, and repub-
licanism by bringing to bear new discursive powers of scientifi c racism, 
renewed imperialism (the colonization of Africa and Asia in the late 
nineteenth century also provided a language and strategy to control 
Spanish American democracy and republicanism), and the “logic” of 
capitalist development to limit and box in subalterns’ appropriation 
of the nation and republicanism. While scientifi c racism helped pro-
mote a xenophobic nationalism in Europe after the 1880s,55 it worked 
in Spanish America to weaken republican nationalism by justifying 
elites’ efforts to exclude racially inferior subalterns from the political 
sphere.56 The refl ourishing of imperialism in Africa and Asia helped 
give great prestige to scientifi c racism and forced Spanish American 
elites to reevaluate their claims to modernity. The discourse and prac-
tices of late nineteenth-century colonialism developed by the British 
and French for Africa and Asia could also be used by Latin American 
elites to master their internal colonies of subalterns. Mark Thurner 
notes that by the 1890s, Peruvians accepted French imperialist justi-
fi cations for colonialism as a “scientifi c discourse” (and indeed used 
them for internal colonial projects in the Amazon), while earlier in 
the century they had rejected such notions.57 The acceptance of such 
ideas meant that by the 1880s, Latin American elites had abandoned 
the idea of being the vanguard of modernity in the Atlantic world, 
instead embracing an aristocratic hispanismo that closely resembled 
53 El Siglo Diez y Nueve (Mexico City), 15 September 1884.
54 Sanders, Contentious Republicans, pp. 153–198.
55 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 91, 107–109.
56 Andrews, Afro-Latin America, pp. 117–151; Richard Graham, ed., The Idea of Race in 
Latin America, 1870 –1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); and Nancy P. Appel-
baum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds., Race and Nation in 
Modern Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
57 Thurner, “After Spanish Rule,” pp. 44–45.
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the discourse Cañizares-Esguerra championed from the colonial era.58 
Conservative elites hoped to regenerate the nation-state by celebrat-
ing elite Spanish culture, thereby ostracizing Amerindians, Afro-Latin 
Americans, and Atlantic republican political discourses and values.59 
By the late nineteenth century, modernity would only come from the 
outside,60 via ideas (scientifi c racism), institutions (increased state 
power), people (European migrants), or capital (foreign investment).
If elites had to restrict democracy to obtain this modernity, they 
would not hesitate to do so. In Mexico, the governor of Oaxaca warned 
his state that people must abandon “once and for all sterile political 
questions” and dedicate themselves only to labor.61 Eliseo Payán, one 
of the leaders of Colombia’s Regeneration, argued that disorder had 
reached such extremes and economic prostration had sunk to such 
depths “that the path of the dictator is considered justifi able as the 
way to obtain order and peace.” 62 Colombia’s subalterns had shown 
themselves eager and able to seize the democratic and republican tradi-
tions of the Atlantic Age of Revolution. Throughout the mid century, 
they successfully claimed these ideas for their own and used them to 
promote their own ends. However, by the 1870s and 1880s, elites and 
the state sought to regain control over the meanings and power of 
democracy and republicanism. The Colombian politician Juan Ulloa 
exhorted that to achieve these changes “there is much work to be done 
in order to make the masses understand what real and true liberty and 
democracy are.” 63 
Perhaps most important, the revival of capitalism in Spanish Amer-
ica, based on the export of primary products and neocolonial invest-
ment and policies by the United States and Europe, gave elites and 
the state the resources to abandon their bargaining with subalterns.64 
58 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, pp. 267, 348.
59 Isidro Sepúlveda Muñoz, Comunidad cultural e hispano-americanismo, 1885–1936 
(Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1994); Frederick B. Pike, “Mak-
ing the Hispanic World Safe from Democracy: Spanish Liberals and Hispanismo,” The 
Review of Politics 33 (July 1971): 307–322.
60 Thurner, “After Spanish Rule,” p. 29.
61 La Libertad (Mexico City), 8 November 1884.
62 Rejistro Ofi cial (Organo de Gobierno del Estado) (Popayán), 1 May 1880.
63 Juan E. Ulloa to Salvador Camacho Roldán, Palmira, 19 June 1879, AGN, Sección 
Academia Colombiana de Historia, Fondo Salvador Camacho Roldán, caja 13, carpeta 166, 
p. 6.
64 For economic history, see Tulio Halperín Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin 
America (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 158–207. McNeill notes how 
the railroad turned trade inward away from the Atlantic by the 1880s, thus ending the 
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Supporters of Díaz in Mexico argued for an activist state that would not 
act as a “servant of the nation” but that would exercise its “right” to 
legislate, judge, and “punish.” 65 States could now afford to raise profes-
sional armies; build prisons; use bureaucracies to map, observe, count, 
quantify and qualify populations; and exploit railroads and telegraphs 
to deploy states forces. This had been predicted decades earlier by Fran-
cisco Bilbao, a great promoter of Atlantic republicanism in the nine-
teenth century, who had urged Americans to look to their own demo-
cratic accomplishments as the path to the future. He warned his fellow 
midcentury republicans not to look to European technological innova-
tions as a path to a just future: “Don’t you see that by means of the tele-
graph and railroads, insurrections can be more rapidly suffocated?” 66 
Of course, this was precisely the goal of those seeking to increase the 
power of the state and control popular mobilization. Unlike earlier in 
the century, the state could now rule over and successfully discipline 
subjects, instead of negotiating with citizens. In Colombia the slow 
rise of such power under the Regeneration after the 1880s signaled an 
end to an Atlantic radical republicanism. Elites succeeded in excluding 
subalterns from republicanism, but at the cost of effectively abandon-
ing their leading role, and the place of democratic republicanism more 
generally, in the political trajectory of the Atlantic World.
The last gasp of the radical, inclusive nineteenth-century Atlan-
tic republican project came in Cuba’s wars for independence. I would 
argue the national visions of José Martí and the Cuban patriot soldiers 
looked back as much to nineteenth-century democratic republicanism 
as they did forward to the twentieth-century debate on the problem 
of race. Ada Ferrer traces a similar rise and fall of the national proj-
ect in Cuba (although much more abbreviated temporally) to what we 
saw in Colombia. She sees the Cuban wars for independence and their 
ultimate failure to achieve an inclusionary society as a harbinger of 
the twentieth-century “problem of the color line,” quoting, of course, 
W. E. B. DuBois.67 However, we can also look on the Cuban struggle 
Atlantic World for him, but for Latin America overseas trade accelerated at this time, if now 
part of a global, rather than Atlantic, system. McNeill, “End of the Old Atlantic World,” 
pp. 246, 251.
65 La Libertad (Mexico City), 3 September 1884.
66 Francisco Bilbao, “El Evangelio Americano,” in Las Obras Completas de Francisco 
Bilbao, ed. Manuel Bilbao (1864; repr., Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Buenos Aires, 1865), 
2:421. 
67 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, p. 202.
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against colonialism and racism as the inheritor of nineteenth-century 
republican struggles to defi ne the nation and the place of lower-class 
and racially diverse citizens within it.
The End of Atlantic Republicanism
The triumph of the elite project to take control of Atlantic republi-
canism should not, however, erase the successes of the previous half 
century. Indeed, a reappraisal of republicanism as a vital historical force 
powered by subaltern discourse and action would also help solve the 
problem, raised by Donna Gabaccia, of uniting the various studies of the 
Atlantic world—the red Atlantic (radical movements from below), the 
black Atlantic (the African diaspora), and the white Atlantic (Euro-
pean expansionism and capitalist developments) at least for the period 
of roughly 1750–1900.68 The republican movements of the Americas 
united a reaction to European expansion with radical movements for 
liberty, equality, and fraternity (especially efforts for both abolition and 
rights for Afro-Americans). Please, do not read liberty, equality, and 
fraternity as Western, or worse, European, unless, by those concepts 
you could include, say, a landless, illiterate ex-slave of African descent 
who would invest those terms with meanings and vitality as impor-
tant as English workers or French intellectuals.69 The Enlightenment, 
democracy, and republicanism were not something exterior to Span-
ish America, but created, manipulated, reframed, and invigorated by 
elites, but more importantly, subalterns across the Atlantic world.
So what processes and dates should mark the end of what we might 
call Atlantic republicanism, at least concerning Spanish America? The 
Age of Revolution simply did not end in Spanish America in 1825 or 
1826, but only truly fl ourished in the subsequent half-century, when 
subalterns seized the discourses and practices of Atlantic republican-
ism and made them their own. Therefore, I propose the collapse of the 
68 For a discussion of red, white, and black Atlantics see Gabaccia, “A Long Atlantic,” 
pp. 1–27; and David Armitage “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in The British Atlantic 
World, 1500 –1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke, UK: Pal-
grave, 2002), pp. 14–15.
69 Of course, cultural theorists have long stressed how subalterns appropriate metro-
politan tools—language and literature especially—for their own ends. I am saying that they 
are not appropriating them, but cocreating them. 
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democratic republican project in Spanish America as a useful marker. 
Thus Atlantic history (or the “red” Atlantic) ends not with 1888 and 
the fi nal abolition of slavery in the Americas, a moment of triumph 
however circumscribed by subsequent events, but with 1898 and defeat, 
as the United States moved to expropriate Cuba’s national republican 
project. A global Age of Empire began to overshadow Atlantic poli-
tics in Spanish America, for if most societies were not reconquered by 
imperial powers, an external and internal neocolonial project—eco-
nomic, political, and cultural—replaced the democratic republican 
movements that fl ourished across nineteenth-century Central and 
South America. 
